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Dog’s Best Friend?
Vivisecting the “Animal” in Mark Twain’s “A Dog’s Tale”
Matthew Guzman

Abstract

“A Dog’s Tale” encapsulates the duality that the domesticated dog as both loyal
“friend” and dependable scientific “instrument” denotes. Twain paints a dark
portrait of man’s association with “beast.” Additionally, the story presents much
more than a simple anthropomorphic tale. Although the nonhuman narrator
has humanlike characteristics, one is always aware that Aileen Mavourneen is a
dog. Nowhere is this divide more apparent than in the narrator’s failed attempts
to “understand” the language and behavior of the human characters. The tale
epitomizes the dogma of man’s rule over “lower” creatures, but it does not fully
reaffirm these accepted beliefs. Rather, the story problematizes our position relative
to these “lower creatures,” most notably through the inconsistencies between
language, interpretation, and physical response; the story also forces readers to
confront the inconsistent treatment of “man’s best friend” as well as humanity’s
privileged locus as reasoning animals.
Keywords: Twain; dogs; nonhuman

animals; critical animal studies;

“A Dog’s Tale”
The catchphrase “man’s best friend” is a well-known reference to the domesticated dog. This common phrase originated from the 1870 closing argument
made by George Graham Vest in a Missouri courthouse over the killing of his
client’s foxhound, “Old Drum,” by a local sheep farmer (Kobbé 10). Vest won
his case, and the expression entered the general lexicon. But can we, with a clear
conscious, label the Canis lupus familiaris with such an encumbered title?1
Mark Twain, especially in the last two decades of his life, vehemently speaks
out against vivisection (“Letter to the London Anti-vivisection Society”) and
satirizes anthropocentricism into a farce (“Was the World Made for Man?”).
The mark twain annual, Vol. 13, 2015
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In his essay “The Lowest Animal,” Twain renounces the Darwinian concept of
the “Ascent of Man” from the lower animals. He states that “since it now seems
plain to me that that theory ought to be vacated in favor of a new and truer
one” (176). Twain goes on to explain that this “new and truer” theory should be
named “the Descent of Man from the Higher Animals” (176). These works, two
essays and one letter, reveal a great deal. Many of his earlier perceptions and/or
prejudices began to change, and as Anthony Brandt notes, in the introduction
to Following the Equator, Twain’s criticism was redirected to the white race’s
“claims to moral superiority,” “greed,” and “arrogance” (xxiii). An important
addition to Brandt’s observations lies in Twain’s identification of the despotic
relationship between human and nonhuman animals, an association which can
be directly observed in “A Dog’s Tale.” Further, this story encapsulates the duality that the domesticated dog as both loyal “friend” and dependable scientific
“instrument” denotes. Twain paints a dark portrait of man’s association with
“beast.” Additionally, the story presents much more than a simple anthropomorphic tale. Although the nonhuman narrator has humanlike characteristics,
one is always aware that Aileen Mavourneen is a dog. Nowhere is this divide
more apparent than in the narrator’s failed attempts to “understand” the language and behavior of the human characters. The tale epitomizes the dogma of
man’s rule over “lower” creatures, but it does not fully reaffirm these accepted
beliefs. Rather, the story problematizes our position to these “lower creatures,”
most notably through the inconsistencies between language, interpretation,
and physical response; the story also forces readers to confront the inconsistent treatment of “man’s best friend” as well as humanity’s privileged locus as
reasoning animals.
In 1911, Killis Campbell attempted to trace the story’s inspirations by d
 rawing
parallels between “A Dog’s Tale” and numerous tales of folklore; Campbell is
quick to point out, though, that this is “his child’s story” (43). Likewise, John
H. Davis, in The Mark Twain Encyclopedia, mentions that the story might have
been for Twain’s daughter Jean, who, according to Davis, was staunchly against
vivisection (223). While the initial motivation or spark of inspiration might
have come from Twain’s daughter, in a historical context Twain is working
among a growing number of individuals who give significant consideration
to the cruelty toward nonhuman animals. The creation of the London Antivivisection Society in 1875 provides clear evidence of this increasing demographic, as does Twain’s own “Letter to the London Anti-vivisection Society.”
“A Dog’s Tale” begins with the first-person narrator introducing herself.
She states, “My father was a St. Bernard, my mother was a collie, but I am
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a Presbyterian” (165). The story consists of three parts, and this opening section
is full of wonderfully comedic scenes, many of which center on the narrator,
Aileen Mavourneen, recalling her mother’s (mis)understanding of human
language. The second section focuses on Aileen’s separation from her mother.
Then, the third and final section contains both Aileen’s dramatic rescue of her
owner’s baby from a house fire and the vivisection of her own child by the
hand of her “master,” Mr. Gray. Words and the comprehension of language
appear impish in the opening section. Later, the irony of these early playful
scenes transform into the narrator’s own plight to understand the actions of
her human “companions.” This first section evidences a foundational trust from
dog to human being, a trust which appears confounded by the discrepancies
between word and action.
Human language intrigues Aileen’s mother. She listens to her owner’s conversations in order to memorize choice words and phrases; then she uses these
chestnuts to impress all of her canine acquaintances. When her friends question the meaning of these words, she gives a different definition each time. The
acquisition of language becomes mostly sounds without meaning, a mimetic
function, and as Aileen expresses, “[Her mother] wasn’t interested in what [the
phrases or words] meant, and knew those dogs hadn’t wit enough to catch her,
anyway” (166). To the other dogs in this tale, with the exception of Aileen,
her mother possesses an elevated knowledge of human expression and, in
effect, human knowledge. So in this regard, the mimicry of words becomes a
status symbol which raises Aileen’s mother above the other “simple” hounds.
Her “knowledge” is illusory, but others unknowingly laud her under this false
pretense.
Steve Baker’s Picturing the Beast: Animals, Identity, and Representation traces
the use of “talking-animal” narratives. He observes that there is a common perception that these types of narratives are not about nonhuman animals at all.
Baker notes that this type of notion “is quite consistent with the far wider cultural trivialization and marginalization of the animal” (138). At first glance, it
may appear that Twain’s story falls into this same general pattern of anthropomorphic representation. Twain’s depiction of these linguistically floundering
nonhuman characters can be viewed as paradoxical; whereas, on the one hand,
Aileen’s mother functions as a faux analogue to her human “superiors,” a subtle
critique of a human propensity to value words over comprehension. On the
other hand, Twain expresses, slyly, the “absurd” idea that dogs can understand
human language by having them misunderstand it. And yes, we can laugh at
these “simple” characters in this opening section. The dogs are noble in their
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actions, but these hounds lack a proper understanding of language and higher
reasoning skills, two characteristics which are used as common justifications
for humanity’s rule over lower creatures. It is a paradox in which these
nonhuman characters reflect a negative characteristic of their human cohorts,
while also highlighting that these dogs are not human. He provides an example
of common preconceptions that dogs are “simplistic” creatures that, at best, can
only mimic without comprehension.
Soon, the story challenges this divide in intellectual capacity between man
and dog. This happens not by proving that the nonhuman animal characters
are somehow intellectually “superior” or equal to the human characters. Rather,
Twain shifts the focus from a dog’s intellectual capacity to a moral one. Aileen
understands the vanity of her mother’s trickery and goes on to elucidate how
her mother’s virtuous traits far outweigh this one small vice. Her mother instills
Aileen with admirable qualities such as gentleness, kindness, and bravery in the
face of danger. Aileen is quick to add that her mother taught “not by words only,
but by example, and that is the best way and the surest and the most lasting”
(167). The time eventually comes when Aileen is sold to another family, and
her mother reiterates the importance of doing “right without reward” (167).
Since Twain already establishes that words are problematic, it is important
that Aileen learns her moral behavior by example. In the narrator’s later selfless actions, one can clearly see this early maternal influence predicated on the
alignment and/or direct relation between physical action and words.
In the third section, Aileen arrives at her new home, and she describes her
new family as sweet and loving. “And I was the same as a member of the family” she says, “and they loved me and petted me” (168). This kind treatment of
Aileen continues for many months. Then winter comes and a fire begins in the
room of the family’s young infant. Aileen, noticing the immediate danger, first
attempts to flee. The memory of her mother’s words holds her back, and she
drags the baby out of the fire. Twain seems intentionally to make Aileen first
act on what one could call an “instinctive” flight reaction to danger, only then to
overcome this “instinct” by a moment of self-reflective thought. Interestingly,
she recalls her mother’s words, not her actions. This may be because at this
point, for Aileen, word and action each represent the same idea. These two
terms are not yet confused by human inconsistencies. Mr. Gray, upon seeing
Aileen carrying his child, does not stop for one moment to think. Rather he
yells, “Begone, you cursed beast!” and delivers a harsh blow to Aileen with his
cane (170). By juxtaposing the actions of a nonhuman animal and human in
distress, Twain not only brings into question the moral “superiority” of human
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beings, but he also provides an example of man acting in a purely instinctive
manner, thus further countering the common assumption that humans are
somehow intrinsically superior to nonhuman animals. Aileen recalls words;
therefore Twain also gives her something exclusively human while stripping
a layer of this same characteristic from his “human” character. Gray misconstrues the situation, but one might assume that a man of science, and scientific
method, would first ask, “Why is my dog dragging the baby down the hall?” No,
the natural reflex to correct a dog’s “bad” behavior is physical abuse.
This scene resembles Twain’s account of a German tourist in Bombay who
strikes a “native” for some unknown “dissatisfaction” (Following the Equator
217–18). Like Aileen, the servant takes this blow “saying nothing.” In this
extract from Following the Equator, Twain is quickly reminded of an early
memory of the violence perpetrated against a slave. The thread that weaves
these excerpts clearly resides in the hierarchies of “personhood” and the inability to “talk” back. Further, one can identify a brief, albeit violent, consistency
between language and action in Mr. Gray, but he bases this quick reactionary
behavior on a clear lack of understanding. Gray misinterprets Aileen’s actions,
and she cannot verbally speak in her own defense. Moreover, Aileen’s position
as a “loving pet” remains dependent on the whims of her owner. It is not until
moments later when the maid alerts the family to the fire that he understands
his error.
Instead of assuming a strictly anthropocentric premise, Twain expresses the
inequities of such relationships, the abuse inflicted on those without a voice. He
imagines how the world would look through the eyes of a dog. And, of course,
unless there is a breakthrough in modern technology, humans will never truly
be able to “know” definitively what a dog is thinking. Humans, however, can
become cognizant of the unequal status of these nonhuman animals. The issue
requires one to go beyond the obvious, such as the maltreatment of these creatures. As Peter Singer, in Animal Liberation, explains, “The extension of the
basic principle of equality from one group to another does not imply that we
must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant exactly the same rights
to both groups. Whether we should do so will depend on the nature of the
members of the two groups. The basic principle of equality does not require
equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration” (2–3). A great deal
of the story’s effectiveness derives from Twain’s identification of the inconsistent “treatment” toward these “lower” creatures. This might appear contradictory to Singer’s passage, which promotes not equal treatment but equal
consideration. Twain seems to be working indirectly toward this consideration
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by, first, showing the harsh and inconsistent treatment which dogs endure from
the human species, and then pairing this with the inability to communicate.
Mr. Gray’s reaction might appear reasonable given this particular circumstance, which is predicated on a misunderstanding; however, Mr. Gray’s attitude
toward Aileen can be described by what Singer calls “speciesism.” Singer defines
this as “a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one’s
own species and against those of members of other species” (7). Paramount
in an anthropocentric worldview is the mentality that nonhuman animals are
below human beings, so therefore it is “natural” to use and/or abuse these nonhuman animals. Singer also identifies a key question that can be applied to
Twain’s story. In a line which Singer borrows from Jeremy Bentham, he states,
“The question is not, Can [nonhuman animals] reason? nor Can they talk? but,
Can they suffer?” (8).
Twain’s understanding of human indifference to nonhuman animals leads
to what Shelley Fisher Fishkin identifies as a “part of this broader disillusionment and despair” with American imperialism (“Introduction” 33). Fishkin
also briefly mentions the possible metaphor between nonhuman animals and
African Americans during the pre–and post–Civil War America era (28). The
link between blackness and animality seems quite apparent due to frequent
associations of black men and women with animals as well as the commodification of each during Twain’s lifetime. In fact, Lesley Ginsberg remarks, in “Slavery
and the Gothic Horror of Poe’s ‘The Black Cat,’” that those who supported slavery heavily relied on blurring the lines between “slaves” and “animals” (103).
“A Dog’s Tale” could be seen as a metaphor for the self-sacrificing mammy, or
a broader representation of the denigrated position of blackness in nineteenthand early twentieth-century America. Like the emotionally removed man of
science, the slave owner must also ignore the cries of pain, must turn a blind eye
to the blood that flows. One may recall some of the derivatives of “dog” which
are targeted toward specific groups of people. The derogatory term “mutt” is
used to describe a person of mixed racial heritage. The term “bitch” can be used
to insult a woman or to depreciate a male’s masculinity. Even calling someone a
“dog” is generally interpreted as a pejorative.
When speaking of the African American slave, Lindon Barrett’s “AfricanAmerican Slave Narratives: Literacy, the Body, Authority” provides another
needed connection between Twain’s animal narrative and the importance of
language. Barrett notes, “Literacy provides manifest testimony of the mind’s
ability to extend itself beyond the constricted limits and conditions of the
body” (419). While Barrett’s article focuses on, as the title suggests, African

34

Matthew Guzman

American slave narratives, he makes an important association. He remarks that
within American slave narratives there are “inexorable connection[s] between
literacy and African-American corporality” (415). That said, the connection
between corporality and literacy can also apply to corporality and the ability
to communicate; it seems the further one moves away from literacy, the lower
he/she measures against an established “gold standard,” or the only standard
(i.e., human). The problem one encounters once again is the hierarchical relationship embedded in and around language, or a lack thereof, as a means of
separation.
After the fire incident in “A Dog’s Tale,” a physically hurt and emotionally
wounded Aileen contemplates running away. She cannot understand why
Mr. Gray abused her for saving the family’s baby. The sole reason she decides to
stay is Robin, her own child. Once Aileen returns from her hiding, the family
showers her with praise and affection. She states, “The days that followed—well,
they were wonderful. The mother and Sadie and the servants—why, they just
seemed to worship me” (172). Aileen’s trust toward her human companions
seems to restore itself. When a friend of Mr. Gray compliments Aileen’s exquisite “instinct,” Mr. Gray is quick to correct him. He states, “It’s far above instinct;
it’s reason” (172). It appears that Aileen is again a member of the Gray household. Mr. Gray believes in Aileen’s capacity for reason, and this acknowledgment removes the common justification of animal experimentation. Reason,
however varied individuals choose to define it, is used by many to support a
position of superiority over other “lower” animals.
By digging down further into human and nonhuman animal relations, one
can also identify the firmly rooted subject/object dichotomy between human
and nonhuman animals. Mark Bernstein comments on this in Without a Tear:
Our Tragic Relationship with Animals. Bernstein notes that humans are thought
of as having a “worth” that does not comes from any service(s) they afford;
rather, humans have an “intrinsic value” (4). Nonhuman animals, on the other
hand, are thought of as “objects.” These nonhuman animals possess only an
instrumental value (4). Both Singer’s and Bernstein’s philosophically grounded
ideas seem to work in tandem, and both can further our understanding of the
subversive hues present within Twain’s text.
The fact that the dog-narrator is given a name and humanlike qualities
might seem like an attempt to “humanize” her; but perhaps rather than this, it
“individualizes” Aileen. This individualization allows readers to move toward
recognizing what Bernstein calls “intrinsic value,” and one can move beyond
identifying Aileen as purely an object. Then, as Singer posits, one can determine
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that this “individual” can (and does) suffer. A reader remains aware throughout
the story that Aileen is a dog, yet in the process of naming and developing
her as a character Twain makes Aileen more than a mere faceless, identity-less
dog. She is Aileen Mavourneen, a half St. Bernard, half collie canine; she is the
mother of Robin. Simultaneously, Twain creates what Joe B. Fulton, in Mark
Twain’s Ethical Realism, calls a “switching” effect. Fulton explains: “Twain allows
the characters themselves to become like ‘another conscience’ inside each other,
and to create, to a sometimes surprising degree, consciousness itself. Twain’s
attempt to ‘be authentic’ encompasses the ethical interaction of these voices
and the aesthetic attempt to create a realistic literature by making them ‘talk as
they do talk’” (23). While Fulton is referring to Twain’s use of regional dialects,
perhaps this can be taken a step further and applied to the nonhuman narration of Aileen. The southern dialects that Twain uses throughout much of his
work gives his readers access to these alternate consciences, one of which is a
piece of the southern black experience; he breathes life into characters like Jim
in Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and, in turn, invites readers into another
conscience. Additionally, Twain gives a voice to “others” who normally do not
have the ability to be heard—nonhuman animals. While dogs do not speak in
an articulate language, outside of fictional stories they do suffer. Twain identifies this and gives a voice to a voiceless nonhuman animal. Because Aileen is
unable to verbally communicate with the human characters in the story, the
“ethical interaction” occurs between the narrator and the reader; it becomes
empathy caused by suffering.
Another of Twain’s stories, “A Horse’s Tale,” presents a nonhuman animal
raconteur. The opening narrative by the horse, Soldier Boy, evidences a nonhuman narrator who shares Aileen’s voiceless position. Soldier Boy notes all
his useful skills and traits, yet he cannot directly communicate with humans.
When he states that he can name any Native American tribe simply by looking at their moccasins, he adds that he can only name the tribe “in horse-talk,
and could do it in American if I had speech” (197). Like Aileen from “A Dog’s
Tale,” Soldier Boy cannot speak to his owner(s), and like Aileen, his “story”
does not end well on account of his exploitation by his multiple masters. Boy
has only brief sections of narration, leaving the rest to be filled by human narration (mostly in the form of letters). Regardless, Boy’s voice is heard both at the
beginning and end of the tale, and this seems to have a similar individualizing
effect as Aileen’s first-person narrative in “A Dog’s Tale.”
There are a number of other memorable scenes and stories from Twain’s
corpus of writing that deal with nonhuman animals. In a majority of these, the
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animals are not narrating. Granted, a reader knows that Twain lurks behind
all narration, human or nonhuman, but the overall result of animal stories
told by a human narrator seems to reduce what Fulton names the “switching
effect.” In “Baker’s Blue-Jay Yarn” for example, the narrator possesses an omniscience that allows him/her access to the bird’s thoughts and feelings. The first
line reads, “When I first begun to understand jay language correctly . . .,” thus
explicitly noting that the bird’s language is being interpreted (87). The bird does
“talk”; however, a “talking” bird brings to mind a parrot, which can learn to
mimic words and phrases. This speech does not seem to interest the narrator
though. He/she is more fascinated by the bird’s tireless efforts placing acorns
in a hole, even remarking, “He laid into his work like a nigger” (89). Action
takes primacy over words, perhaps because, again, the vocalizations of birds are
mimetic and therefore seem to lose their authenticity or legitimacy (both for
the reader and the fictional narrator). But “understanding” jay language is not a
means of understanding the bird’s actions; rather, it gives the narrator a means
to laugh at this “simple” bird.
Likewise, in an early scene from Pudd’nhead Wilson, one may recall how
David Wilson gets his eponymous name, Pudd’nhead, after hearing a dog “yelp
and snarl and howl” (25). The voice of the dog is distanced from a physical
body. As the text clearly states, these noises were heard from an “invisible dog”
(25). Wilson jokingly makes the comment about wishing to own half of the
dog so he could kill his half, but the humor of his remark is lost to the “simple”
townsfolk. A reader understands the miscommunication, but the other characters do not. The townsfolk try to reason through Wilson’s joke, finally deciding
he is a “Pudd’nhead.” Again, Twain confronts his readers with a disembodied
representation of a nonhuman animal and evidences another example where
words and actions conflict.
In the final scenes of “A Dog’s Tale,” Mr. Gray takes Aileen’s puppy into the
laboratory. Aileen watches with pride, unaware of the events which unfold.
Her puppy, bleeding from his head, stumbles and then falls to the floor. The
experiment causes Robin to go blind. Gray’s associates praise the experiment,
stating, “It’s so—you’ve proved your theory, and suffering humanity owes you
a great debt from henceforth” (173). Robin dies a few moments later, and
Mr. Gray orders a servant to bury “it” in the far corner of the garden and continues his conversation with the rest of his colleagues. Aileen cannot understand why Robin will not grow like the seeds that they plant earlier in the story.
In his “Letter to the London Anti-vivisection Society” (1899), Twain mentions Claude Bernard, a “notorious French vivisector” (139). Lori Gruen, Peter
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Singer, and David Hine also mention this same French vivisector in Animal
Liberation: A Graphic Guide, explaining, “The growth of animal experimentation gave another boost to the movement of animal welfare because of the
horrific—though entirely accurate—details that emerged about what was
being done to animals” (41). Claude Bernard himself argues, “A physiologist
is no ordinary man. He is a learned man, a man possessed and absorbed by
a scientific idea. He does not hear the animal’s cry of pain. He is blind to the
blood that flows. He sees nothing but his idea” (qtd. in Gruen, Singer, and
Hine 41). Clearly Twain knows of Claude Bernard and this type of “deaf ” man
of science during the time “A Dog’s Tale” was written (1903). One can easily
identify something akin to Bernard’s “physiologist” within Twain’s fictional
representation of Mr. Gray. More generally, Bernard illustrates a prime example
of scientific exploitation of animals as well as the disconnect between human
and nonhuman suffering.
In When Species Meet, Donna Haraway discusses Jacques Derrida’s lifetime
struggle against the idea that “response” is limited to humans and that animals
possess only the ability to “react” (77–78). As Derrida states, “The question of
the said animal in its entirety comes down to knowing not whether the animal
speaks but whether one can know what respond means” (qtd. in Haraway
79). Susan McHugh, in “Literary Animal Agents,” expands on Derrida’s
struggle. McHugh posits, “So often applied to examples of existing canon,
this formulation of nonhuman traces as deconstructing human attempts at
self-representation elaborates the logic of substitution through which the animal’s sacrifice (i.e., its real and representational consumption) supports the
human. But it c reates more problems than it resolves. . . . This implies that animal subjectivity remains significant only as an essentially negative force against
which the human is asserted—hence the appeal of metaphoric animals” (489).
In the case of Aileen, one knows what her “responses” mean, but regardless,
McHugh makes a valid objection to a deconstructive approach in assigning
value to nonhuman animals. Do these beings exist only to reaffirm what constitutes a human (e.g., those beings which are not animals)? Moreover, Haraway
explains that “the problem is actually to understand that human beings do not
get a pass on the necessity of killing significant others, who are themselves
responding, not just reacting” (80). In addition to voice, Twain inverts human
response by illustrating Mr. Gray’s propensity to act in a reactionary manner.
Again, these serve to support Twain’s comment, in “The Lowest Animal,” that
Darwin had it all wrong about man’s ascent from lower animals (at least in a
moral sense). The poignant line from Huck, in Adventures of Huckleberry Finn,
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that “human beings can be awful cruel to one another,” perhaps underpins
Twain’s later feelings toward the maltreatment of “lower” animals (321). This
cruelty persists when those being hurt do not possess the ability and/or opportunity to “talk” back and merits a connection to the other forms of dehumanization, such as slavery and racism, which Twain observed throughout his life.
Gray’s hypocrisy is clear from his inconsistent behavior toward Aileen. One
moment he treats her as a member of the family, and the next moment he
vivisects Aileen’s child. In the story, Aileen’s moral behavior far outweighs the
actions of her human counterparts. Gray exclaims, oblivious to the irony of
his own words, “There, I’ve won—confess it! He’s as blind as a bat!” (175).
When the associate of Mr. Gray announces that “suffering humanity” owes
him a great debt, one cannot overlook the cost of this frivolous “experiment.”
This phrase also carries a dark causticness because the only beings who suffer
in this story are not human. But what seems obvious to the men of science is
not apparent to the canine narrator. Once again, the interpretation of human
language becomes problematic when words and actions conflict with one
another.
When a human strikes a dog, does the dog not respond? As Aileen drags
the “screaming little creature” from the fire and is assaulted for her valor, she
retreats to a dark corner of the house (170–71). She remarks how she resisted
the urge to whimper, “though it would have been such a comfort ” (170).
Likewise, when Mr. Gray blinds Robin, the puppy “shrieked” (173). A dog will
“yelp” or “whimper” in times of pain. One might venture to guess that David
Wilson (aka Pudd’nhead Wilson) wished he had not heard, or commented on,
the yelps and howls of a hound. In times of extreme emotion, humans will also
resort to prelinguistic forms of expression. In moments of overwhelming sadness one may cry; in instances of gaiety one may laugh. The speaker reverts to
Whitman’s “barbaric yawp over the roofs of the world” (76). In other words
(irony intended), there are limits which human language cannot reach. The
“barbaric yawp,” then, can communicate between species, albeit primal and
inarticulate, if one is not too deaf to hear these cries.
Admittedly, the study of nonhuman animals and their representation(s) in
literature continues to remain a strictly human affair, but this does not mean
we should not strive to allot these nonhuman living beings their due consideration. This also does not mean we should cease to expand, refine, and question
how we choose to carry on the discussion of this relationship. Twain identifies
our hypocritical relationship with these “lower” creatures, some of whom we
label our “friends.” History is swollen with similar inequities, many of which
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were socially condoned, propagated, and legally enforced. With these groups of
subjugated people, there came a silence. There was silence because speaking out
meant sometimes dire (and nonfictional) consequences.
Twain’s story, therefore, can be viewed as a move beyond the objectification of animals, yet this movement is located outside this fictional context.
It provides no transcendental movement within its human characters. This
movement, however, can occur within our own capacity to apply “reason”
to the plight of nonhuman animals. It is a movement that does not seem to
require the deconstruction of beings into diacritical configurations; hence
we might avoid gauging humanity’s moral progress by its distance from “the
animal.” Twain’s short story, which some dismiss as “sentimental” and/or
“pathetic,” does evoke a certain pathos within readers, but the emotion is not
simple “pity” or “nostalgia.” Perhaps this feeling could be labeled an empathy which crosses species, a “barbaric yawp” which echoes in our ears long
after this short story has ended. By critically analyzing Twain’s “A Dog’s Tale,”
with careful attention to the representation of nonhuman animals and the
disconnection between words and actions, we can, in effect, begin to reimagine, reconstitute, or at the very least reevaluate the way we perceive and
discuss the relationship between humans and nonhuman animals. There is
something humanity can learn from this simple short story, and it moves far
beyond any emotional response. The lesson stems from the actions of human
characters as well as the devoted, although exploited, position of Aileen. We
can look to the problematic limits of language and begin to hear the “yawps”
and yelps.
matthew guzman received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from the
University of Texas at San Antonio, and he is currently a Ph.D. student at the
University of Nebraska–Lincoln. His work focuses on nineteenth-century
American literature, with an emphasis on the representation of nonhuman
animals.

Notes
1. In the United States alone, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
“Animal Welfare Report,” in 2005, 66,610 dogs were used for scientific testing. More
recently, in 2010, the same government organization reports that 64,930 dogs were
subjected to experimentation. Although the number of guinea pigs or rabbits used is
a much higher figure (each at over 200,000), the number of canines remains relatively
constant. In 2010, these 64,930 scientific subjects contributed to a staggering total of
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1,134,693 nonhuman animals used in the name of science. These figures, again, reflect
usage only within the United States, and they do not include the most common species
used in experimentation, rats and mice.
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